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PEOPLE V.

J AOXSON

[Crim. No. 8910. In Bank.

[67 C.2d

July 25, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE
AKIN JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-Judgment-Collateral Attack: ReviewConfessions and Admissions.-In a prosecution for murder, in
which, nearly a year before Escobedo was decided, the availability of appeal to the Supreme Court was exhausted and no
certiorari was sought, the scope of the retrial (and appeals
therefrom) on the issue of penalty, such retrial arising from
defendant's petition for habeas corpus and a reversal under
the retroactive application of Morse, was a matter of state
procedure under which the original judgment on the issue of
guilt remained final and invulnerable to attack on the basis of
Escobedo.
. [2] Id.-Judgment-Collateral Attack-Finality of Judgment.A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct review
are exhausted.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Judgment-Collateral Attack: Review-Confessions
and Admissions: Habeas Corpus-As Substitute for Appea.l.The issue of the alleged general involuntariness of an accused's extrajudicial statements, unrelated to Escobedo, could
not, as to the issue of guilt, be raised for the first time on
appe&l from the judgment against him on retrial of the penalty phase (such retrial arising from a habeas corpus petition
and reversal under a retroactive application of Morse), where
the issue of voluntariness had been considered in the original
trial in a full and fair hearing, and where the accused offered
no explanation for his failure to raise such issue either on his
initial unsuccessful appeal or in his habeas corpus petition,
which was filed after any further availability of appeal and
certiorari was exhausted.
[4] Habeas Corpus-As Substitute for Appeal.-An issue which is
raised in a criminal trial, and upon which conflicting testimony develops, cannot serve as a basis for habeas corpus;
piecemeal presentation or split adjudication of such issues cannot be sanctioned.
[3] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 11; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus (1st ed § 19).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1019, 1254.5; [2]
Criminal Law, § 1019; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 1019, 1254.5; Habeas
Corpus, § 12(1); [4, 5] Habeas Corpus, § 12; [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1382.1(14) ; Homicide, § 262.
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[6] Id.-As Substitute for Appeal.-An accused's failure to exercise his readily available remedies of trial and appeal to secure
his federal constitutional rights will ordinarily constitute such
a deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures as to justify
denial of federal as well as state collateral relief.
[6] Criminal Law - Appeal- Reversible Error - Testimony Impelled by Erroneous Admission of Extrajudicial Statements:
Bomicide-Error.-In a prosecution for murder, initially tried
before the effective date of Escobedo-Dorado, it was reversible
error on retrial of the penalty phase after such date, to admit
defendant's prior trial testimony, where such testimony had to
be deemed to have been a product of the admission of extrajudicial statements taken in violation of Escobedo-Dorado, and
where, under the Ohapman test, it could not be said beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County. Leo A. Deegan, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing death penalty
reversed and the cause remanded for retrial on the issue of
penalty only. i
I

Gladys Towles Root, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Richard L. Brand for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
,

TRAYNOR, C. J.-A judgment convicting defendant of
mst degree murder and sentencing him to death was affirmed
on appeal. (People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 375 [29 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937].) Thereafter, because of errors condemned in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], we issued a writ of
habeas corpus and reversed the judgment insofar as it related
to penalty. (I'll re Jackson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 500 [39 Cal.Rptr.
220, 393 P.2d 420].) Upon retrial, defendant waived a jury
trial, and the court fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 623; Am.Jur.2d,Appeal
and Error, § 797 et seq.
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The essential facts are set forth in our former opinion and
need not be repeated. (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Cal.2d
375.)
By stipulation the evidence at the penalty retrial consisted
of the transcripts of the trial on the issue of guilt and the
first trial on the issue of penalty, subject to objections and
further testimony. The trial court assumed that EscobeM v .
. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977,84 8.Ct. 1758],
applied and deleted from the transcript all of defendant's
extrajudicial admissions and all questions and answers of
defendant on cross-examination that related to his interrogation. The court, however, did not delete defendant's other
testimony that included seriously damaging admissions.
[1a] Defendant contends that statements inadmissible
under EscobeM v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. 478, and People v.
Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361], were introduced into evidence at his trial on the issue of
guilt and that both judgments should therefore be reversed.
We do not reach the question of the admissibility of
defendant's statements under Escobedo and Dorado at the
trial on the issue of guilt. A judgment that became final·
before June 22, 1964, the date on which the Supreme Court
decided the EscobeM case, cannot be attacked on the basis of
that case. (In re Shipp (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 547, 549 [43 Cal.
Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571] ; In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372
[42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380] ; see Johnson v. New Jersey
(1966) 384 U.S. 719, 733 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892, 86 S.Ct.
1772] .)
[2] A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct
review are exhausted. (People v. Ketchel (1966) 63 Cal.2d
859, 863-865 [48 Cal.Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694] ; In re Spencer
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 405 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33] ; see
Tehan v. Shott (1966) 382 U.S. 406,409 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 455,
86 8.Ct. 459] ; Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622
[14 L.Ed.2d 601, 604, 85 8.Ct. 1731].) [1b] In the present
case the availability of appeal in this court was exhausted on
May 1, 1963, when defendant's petition for rehearing was
denied (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Ca1.2d 375, 381). He did
not seek certiorari. Thus, almost a year before Escobedo was
decided, defendant had exhausted all remedies for direct
review of the original proceedings determining his guilt and
the penalty. Thereafter this court granted defendant's petition for habeas corpus and reversed the judgment only on the
issue of penalty, thereby affording a collateral remedy for a
)
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'etrospective application of People v. Morse, supra, 60 Ca1.2d
i31. The scope of this retrial is a matter of state procedure
mder which the original judgment on the issue of guilt
'emains final during the retrial of the penalty issue and
luring all appellate proceedings reviewing the trial court's
lecision on that issue. (See In re Gaines (1965) 63 Cal.2d 234
[45 Cal.Rptr. 865, 404 P.2d 473]; In re Lopez, supra, 62
0a1.2d 368, 370.)
[Sa] Defendant also attacks the judgment on the issue of
~uilt on the ground that his extrajudicial statements were
.nvoluntary even if Escobedo does not apply. (See Johnson v.
N'ew Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719, 730 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 890].)
He contends that he was given no warnings, that his request
to consult with counsel was ignored, that he was allowed to
see his mother and aunt in return for a promise to confess,
and that he was urged to confess by the district attorney who
purported to be advising him.
.
The trial court in the original trial considered the issue of
voluntariness in a full and fair hearing. It heard substantial
evidence, including defendant's testimony, that his statements were voluntary, and it admitted them into evidence
over objection. Neither on his appeal (People v. Jackson,
supra, 59 Ca1.2d 375, 377) nor· in his petition for habeas
corpus (I'll. re Jackson, supra, 61 Ca1.2d 500) did defendant
challenge the voluntariness of his statements.
On this appeal from the judgment on the issue of penalty,
the attack on the judgment on the issue of guilt is governed
by the rules applicable to a collateral attack. (People v. Polk
(1965) 6:t Ca1.2d 443, 448 [47 Cal.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641].)
[4] "We have consistently held that an issue which is raised
in the trial court, and upon which conflicting testimony
develops, cannot serve as a basis for habeas corpus; we cannot
sanction piecemeal presentation or split adjudication of such
issues. . . . " (In re Shipp, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 547, 552, cert.
den. (1966) 382 U.S. 1012 [15 L.Ed.2d 528, 86 S.Ct. 623].)
[5] Moreover, failure to exercise" readily available remedies
will ordinarily constitute such a deliberate bypassing of
orderly state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well
as state collateral relief." (In re Sterling (1965) 63 Ca1.2d
486,489 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5] ; In re Shipp, supra,
62 Cal.2d 547, 554-555; Pen. Code, § 1475.)1 [3b] DefendlSee Fay v. Now (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 837, 869, 83 S.Ct.
822]; Sanders v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. I, 17-18 [10 L.Ed.2d
148, 162-163, 83 S.Ct. 1068]; De Welles v. United States (7th Cir_ 1967)
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ant offers no explanation for his failure to raise the issue
whether his statements were voluntary at the prior proceedings. Under these circumstances the issue may not now be
raised.
[6] 'Vith respect to the second trial on the issue of
penalty, defendant contends that the court erred in not deleting all of his testimony at the first trial. He correctly points
out that such testimony must be deemed a product of the
admission of his statements into evidence (People v. Spencer
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 158, 164-168 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d
715]) and that if those statements were inadmissible at his
penalty retrial, his testimony was also inadmissible.
Whether those statements were inadmissible turns on
whether Escobedo and Dorado were applicable to defendant's
penalty retrial, which began on October 16, 1964. Although
defendant '08 conviction was final before June 22, 1964, when
Escobedo was decided, his retrial on the issue of penalty
occurred after that date. Under these circumstances we are
persuaded that People v. Doherty (1967) ante, p.9 [59 Cal.
Rptr. 857,429 P.2d 177], is controlling and that Escobedo and
Dorado were therefore applicable.
Defendant's extrajudicial statements were taken in violation of Escobedo and Dorado, and his testimony must be
deemed a product of the admission of those statements. (People v. Spencer, supra, 66 Cal.2d 158, 168.) We cannot'say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting that
testimony at the penalty retrial was harmless. (Ohapman v.
Oalifornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711, 87
S.Ct.824].)
The judgment imposing the death penalty is reversed and
the cause remanded for retrial on the issue of penalty only.
Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and White, J.,.
concurred.
PETERS, J.-Concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority insofar as they reverse the judg372 F.2d 67, 68·69; Thornton v. United StateB, 368 F.2d 822, 825, 829;
Campbell v. United StateB (7th Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 394, 395; Nash v.
United StateB (5th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 366, 368; Vena v. Warden, State
PriBon (Conn. 1966) 225 A.2d 802; Dunek v. District Court 01 Lee
COU71ty (Iowa 1966) 140 N.W.2d 372, 374; Brown v. Wingo (Ky. 1965)
396 S.W.2d 785; Comonwealt1, v. Cavell (1967) 423 Pa. 597· [225 A.2d
673]; 28 U.S.C.A. II 2244, 2254 (amended by 80 Stat. 1104 (1966».
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign·
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Councll.

1j
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ment imposing the death penalty. I dissent from that portion
of the majority opinion that refuses to consider the impact of
tIle errors on the issue of guilt.
This case has been before us several times. On April 2, 19G:l,
we affirmed the first degree murder judgment imposing the
death penalty (People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375 [29 Cal.Rptr.
505, 379 P.2d 937]). Thereafter, on July 6, 1964, on habeas
corpus, a new penalty trial was ordered because of errors
condemned in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr.
201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810]. The judgment was
affirmed in all other respects (In re Jackson, 61 CaI.2d 500
[39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420]). At the new penalty trial, a
jury was waived, and again the death penalty was imposed.
The present appeal is from that judgment and is automatic.
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
The appellant contends that at both the original guilt trial
and at the retrial of the penalty issue there were admitted
into evidence admissions and a confession in violation of the
rules established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12
L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758]; and People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d
338 [4~ Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P .2d 361], and that such errors
were highly prejudicial.
The majority find that such errors occurred and require a
reversal of the penalty issue, but also hold that such errors
cannot be legally considered on the guilt issue. With this
latter conclusion I disagree.
.
It is established law that judgments which become "final"
prior to the date of Escobedo (June 22, 1964) may not be
attacked on the basis of Escobedo or Dorado. (In re Lopez, 62
Cal.2d 368, 372 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) The rule
defining finality for this purpose is stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
622, in footnote 5 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 604, 85 8.Ct. 1731] : "By
final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered,
the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition
for certiorari had elapsed. . . . "
In the present case the availability of appeal was exhausted
on May 1, 1963, when defendant's petition for rehearing was
denied by this court (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Ca1.2<l 375,
381), and, since certiorari was not sought by defendant, the
time for petitioning for certiorari elapsed 90 days thereafter.l
lThe 90-day period runs from the date of filing of the opinion unless a
timely petition for rehearing is filed, in which ease it runs from the date

)
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Thus, under these rules, there can be no doubt that at one
point the issue of guilt and the issue of penalty were both
"final" befure Escobedo was decided. But we recalled the
remittitur, at least 011 the penalty issue. This reopened the
penalty issue and required a retrial of that issue, which
occurred after Escobedo. The real question with which we are
now concerned is whether that action had any effect on the
guilt issue so far as certiorari is concerned.
In several cases decided by tbis court we have apparently
held that a determination of guilt is final for some purposes
even though we reverse for a new penalty trial. We have held
that if on the penalty retrial an attack is made on the guilt
issue it is a collateral attack. (People v. Polk, 63 Cal.2d 443,
447-448 [47 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641] ; cf. People v. Terry, 61
Cal.2d 137, 151 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]; People
v. Love, 56.Ca1.2d 720,725 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481,
366 P.2d 33, 809].) But we are not concerned with these
generalizations. We are concerned with what the United
States Supreme Court considers as "final" for the purposes
here involved. That court has determined that finality for
such purposes depends on when the time for petitioning for .
certiorari to that court lias elapsed. Thus, the question of
whether' a reversal of the penalty issue also affected the
finality of the jUdgment of guilt depends not upon our own
definition of finality but upon whether the United States
Supreme Court would treat the issue of guilt as reopened on a
petition for certiorari properly filed from an affirmance after
a penal ty retrial.
There can be no doubt that affirmance of a judgment of
guilt is considered a "final" judgment, so as to permit an
immediate review by the United States Supreme Court, even
though a new trial is ordered on the penalty issue. (Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85, fn. 1 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 217, 83
8.Ct. 1194].) But this is not decisive. The high court has also
held that, even though such a first review is possible on the
issue of guilt, after a final determination of the penalty the
issues involved on the guilt trial may be reviewed on the
review of the penalty trial. This was the precise holding of
Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 [11 L.Ed.2d 229, 84 8.Ct.
298], cited with approval by this court in People v. Ketchel,
63 Cal.2d 859, 864 [48 Cal.Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694]. There
of the denial of the petition for rehearing. (Market Street Ey. 00. V.
Railroad Com., 324 U.S. 548, 550·552 [89 L.Eil. 1171, 1176·1177, 65 S.Ct.
770].)

I
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defendant was sentenced twice for the same crime under a
federal statute providing that an initial sentence may be rendered until more detailed information as a basis for determining final sentence is available. Recognizing that certiorari was
available 19 review the first sentence, the court held that as a
practical matter, the severity of the final sentence imposed is
often. a· major factor in deciding whether to appeal, and that
defendant had the option of appealing from either sentence
because Congress did not intend to subject a defendant to the
burden of having to choose whether to appeal without first
knowing Ilis punishment. The court stated that "Longaccepted and conventional principles of federal appellate
. procedure require recognition of the defendant's right to
await the imposition of final sentence before seeking review of
the conviction. That is the general rule." (Corey v. United
States, supra, 375 U.S. at p. 176 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 234].)
. By this rule, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the decisive importance of knowing what the final sentence is before deciding whether to seek certiorari. Obviously
the high court would not require one whose conviction is
affirmed but the penalty reversed to choose once and for all
right then whether to petition for certiorari on the guilt issue.
In fact, it has been held in this state that where the issue of
guilt is final but not the issue of penalty, the issue of guilt
can be attacked on Escobed'O-Dorado grounds. (People v.
Ketchel, supra, 63 Cat2d 859, 863-865.) In the present case
the penalty judgment as well as the guilt judgment was
"final" before Escobedo, so that the defendant knew his
punishment at the time he was required to determine whether
to petition for certiorari. He did not do so. But then, for
proper reasons, we recalled the remittitur, and reopened the
penalty issue. The present status of the case is the same as if
we had ordered a new penalty trial on the first appeal. When
we recalled our remittitur so as to reverse as to the penalty,
the remittitur relating to the guilt trial was also necessarily
recalled. 2 It is quite significant that without passing directly
on the issue, it has been our practice to again affirm the judgment of guilt after reversing the penalty determination. ( In

I
I

2When a remittitur is recalled the court does not "resume" jurisdiction that was lost by the issuance of the remittitur after the first appeal.
The theory is that because of the irregularity jurisdiction was never lost.
Once recalled, the decision on the first al!peal is a nullity. (Isenberg v.
Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 726 [7 P.2d 1006J; Rowland v. Kreyenhagen, 24

Cal. 52, 59.)

)
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re J fU:,kson, supra, 61 Cal.2d 500, 508.) This would be
meaningless if the guilt issue were not before us.
Under both state and federal law a final judgment from
which an appeal may be taken in a criminal case is the sentence, that is, the judgment is the sentence. (Oorey v. United
States, supra, 375 U.S. 169, 174 [11 L.Ed.2d 229, 233] ; People
v. Sweeney, 55 Cal.2d 27, 33, fn. 1 [9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d
1049].) This equation of the judgment with the sentence
strongly suggests that when a sentence is reversed no matter
when, the United States Supreme Court will deem the whole
judgment, including the conviction, to be reopened for the
purpose of direct attack by writ of certiorari.
It follows, of course, that since the penalty determination is
not yet final, defendant may attack the guilt trial on the
ground that statements were admitted in violation of Escobedo and Dorado. s Because the case on the guilt issue was
tried before Escobedo, defendant's failure to object to the
admission of his statements does not preclude him from raising the question on appeal. (People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692,
711 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].)
If the guilt trial is reopened by the granting of a new trial
as to penalty, as I believe should be done, there can be no
doubt' that evidence was admitted during the guilt trial that
violated the principles of Escobedo and Dorado. The question
of whether such errors were prejudicial should, in my opinion, be reviewed on this appeal. That they were prejudicial
seems to me clear beyond a possibility of a doubt. My reasons
need not now be set forth in view of the majority's refusal to
even consider the question of error.
Thus, while I agree with the majority in the holding that
the judgment insofar as it relates to penalty must be reversed,
I disagree with the majority in holding that the propriety of
the guilt determination should not also be reversed.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the jUdgment
imposing the death penalty.
SIt is true that in In re Lopez, supra, 62 Cal.2d 368, where' we reversed
the penalty trial because of errors condemned in People v. Mor8e, 8upra,
60 Ca1.2d 631, we held that the judgment of guilt may not be attacked on
Escobedo-Dorado grounds because the guilt judgment had been affirmed
prior to the decision in Escobe.do. Thus, factually, the problem involved
bere was also there involvetl, hut the legal effect of the reversal as to
penalty, the point here discussed, was not considered. It is elementary law
that an opinion is not an authority for any proposition not considered in it.

